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OEDIPALISATION

would, then, be a study or science not of appearances (phenomenology)
nor ideas (ideology) but noology. If there are pure noema – or ‘thinkables’
– we can also imagine approaching life, not as grounded in personal consciousness, but as a history of various images of thought, or what counts
as thinking. Ideology, for example, is the image of a mind that can think
only through an imposed or external structure; phenomenology is the
image of a mind that forms its world and whose ideas and experiences are
structured by a subject oriented towards truth.
In general, noology can be opposed to ideology. Instead of arguing that
we, as proper subjects, are subjected to ideas that are false and that might
be demystified, Deleuze argues that it is the idea of a proper ‘we’ and
assumption of the good self or ‘mind’ which precludes us from actualising
our potential. Noology, as it is defined in A Thousand Plateaus, is not only
the study of images of thought, but also claims a ‘historicity’ for images.
The modern subject who is subjected to a system of signifiers is therefore
produced and has its genesis in previous relations of subjection. In addition
to its critical function, noology therefore assumes that if images of thought
have been created they can always be recreated, with the ideal of liberation
from some proper image of thought being the ultimate aim. In Difference and
Repetition, Deleuze argues that we have failed to think truly precisely because
we assume or presuppose an ‘image of thought’. Not only philosophy, but
everyday notions of common sense and good sense fail to question just what
it is to think. In this regard, the concept of mind (or, in Greek, nous) has been
an unargued, implicit and restrictive postulate of our thinking. Noology does
not only study what it might mean for human subjects to think; it also strives
to imagine thought carried to its infinite power, beyond the human.
Connective
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In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari describe human beings as unfolding
processes of individuation in constant interaction with their surroundings,
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and they characterise three syntheses of the unconscious: connective syntheses that join elements into series (‘desiring-machines’, for example,
mouth and breast), disjunctive syntheses that resonate series in metastable
states (‘Bodies without Organs’ (BwO), for example, mouth and breast
or head and arm or milk and stomach resonating in a state of bliss), and
conjunctive syntheses that gather metastable states into the continuous
experience of conscious awareness. They propose that Oedipal subjectivity is but one form that human sentience can take. The syntheses they
describe have anoedipal as well as Oedipal forms. ‘Oedipalisation’ is a
contemporary form of social repression that reduces the forms desire takes
– and thus the connections desire makes – to those that sustain the social
formation of capitalism.
Capitalism’s emphasis on the abstract quantification of money and
labour (what matters is how capital and labour circulates – not the specific form wealth takes or who in particular does what) encourages desire
to permute across the social field in unpredictable ways. Oedipalisation
reduces the anarchic productivity of unconscious desire to familial forms
of desire. Productive desire that flows according to immanent principles
becomes organised in terms of ‘lack’, thus reducing the multiple forms
desire can take to those forms that can be referred to the personal identities
of the Oedipal triangle. On the BwO, desire is the only subject. It passes
from one body to another, producing partial objects, creating breaks
and flows, and making connections that destroy the unity of a ‘possessive or proprietary’ ego (D&G 1983: 72). Oedipalisation makes it appear
that partial objects are possessed by a person and that it is the person
who desires. Productive desire that would fragment personal identity is
reduced to the desire of a person who wants to fill in a lack. Oedipalisation
thus ensures that the innovations of deterritorialising capital are constrained by the tightly bound parameters of personal identity and familial
life (or the triangulated authority relationships that mimic Oedipus in the
public realm).
According to Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipalisation constitutes an
illegitimate restriction on the productive syntheses of the unconscious
because it emphasises global persons (thus excluding all partial objects of
desire), exclusive disjunctions (thus relegating the subject to a chronological series of moments that can be given a coherent narrative account), and
a segregative and biunivocal use of the conjunctive syntheses (thus reducing the identity of the subject to a coherent or static set of one side of a set
of oppositions). The subjection of desire to a phallic paradigm results in
a subject who experiences himself as ‘having’ an identity that is fixed on
either one side or the other of various oppositional divides (male or female,
white or black), and who designates the various pleasurable and painful
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states through which he passes in terms of the attributes of a fundamentally unchanging identity.
Capitalism’s drive for ever-new sources of profit fosters innovating flows
of desire that, if left to themselves, could so alter capitalist formations that
the latter would evolve into something else. Oedipalisation is a form of
social repression that funnels the productive capacity of the unconscious
back into the constricting channels of Oedipal desire. Following Oedipal
subjectivity to its limits and beyond entails liberating unconscious production so that desire can create new realities. Whereas Oedipal desire
constitutes the subject as lacking the object desired, the goal of anoedipal
desire is immanent to its process: it seeks not what it lacks but what allows
it to continue to flow. In order to flow, anoedipal desire must mutate and
transform in a self-differentiating unfolding implicated with the social
field of forces of which it is a part. Deleuze and Guattari reject the psychoanalytic contention that the only alternative to Oedipal subjectivity is
psychosis and instead explore anoedipal flows of desire and the schizo who
is a functioning subject of such desire. Their notion of the unconscious
suggests ways of approaching its ‘symptoms’ that point to possibilities for
creative transformation inevitably linked with social change.
Connectives
Body without Organs
Capitalism
Desire
Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation
Psychoanalysis
Subjectivity
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Constantin V. Boundas
For Deleuze, philosophy is ontology. In this sense, he is one of only two
philosophers (the other being Emmanuel Lévinas) of the generation we
call ‘poststructuralists’ not to demur in the face of ontology and metaphysics. Deleuze’s ontology is a rigorous attempt to think of process and
metamorphosis – becoming – not as a transition or transformation from one
substance to another or a movement from one point to another, but rather
as an attempt to think of the real as a process. It presupposes, therefore, an
initial substitution of forces for substances and things, and of (transversal)

This content downloaded from 130.58.106.203 on Tue, 21 Jan 2020 16:29:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
M2328 - PARR TEXT.indd 196

10/08/2010 16:17

